Cloud computing can provide a flexible way to effectively share data among multiple users since it can overcome the time and location constraints of computing resource usage. However, the users of cloud computing are still reluctant to share sensitive data to a cloud server since the cloud server should be treated as an untrusted entity. In order to support secure and efficient data sharing in cloud computing environment, Wei et al. recently extended the concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) to support key revocation and ciphertext update functionalities, and proposed a revocable-storage identity-based encryption (RS-IBE) scheme. In this paper, we show that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not satisfy the correctness property of RS-IBE. In addition, we propose a method to modify the existing RS-IBE scheme to be a correct and secure scheme.
Introduction
Cloud computing is a new paradigm of computing system that provides computing resources such as computing power or data storage according to the need of users. The advantage of cloud computing is that cloud service users can use their computing resources as a service with low cost at any time from anywhere through the Internet. Many technology companies provide various types of cloud services. The main difference between traditional server computing and cloud computing is that a cloud service provider can no longer be regarded as a trusted entity. In other words, the cloud service provider should be treated as a honest-but-curious adversary.
A typical application of cloud computing is to securely share data among a large number of users. In this system, the data confidentiality should be provided because the cloud service provider is no longer a trusted entity. In addition, if a user's credential is expired or the user's private key is compromised, then a proper revocation method should be provided to handle this user. Furthermore, even if a revoked user tries to access past data stored in the cloud server through collusion attacks, the security of data should be guaranteed. Therefore, a secure data sharing system in the cloud server should consider various security issues described above.
Recently, a revocable-storage identity-based encryption (RS-IBE) scheme for secure data sharing in cloud storage was proposed by Wei et al. [7] . The basic idea of this RS-IBE scheme is to modify an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to additionally supports the key revocation and ciphertext update functionalities. In particularly, they used the IBE scheme of Waters for the underlying IBE scheme and the tree-based key revocation scheme of Boldyreva et al. [1] for key revocation. Additionally, they modified their scheme to support efficient ciphertext update by following the idea of forward-secure cryptographic systems.
In this paper, we show that there is a serious problem in the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. That is, if a ciphertext generated at time T is updated to another ciphertext with time T + 1 by the ciphertext update algorithm, then this updated ciphertext with time T + 1 cannot be decrypted by using a decryption key with time T + 1. The reason of this decryption failure problem is that the decryption algorithm uses a random value which is different from the random value used to encrypt a message if a ciphertext is updated. A more detailed explanation of this problem is given in the later part of this work. To remedy this problem, we propose a method to modify the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. to be a secure scheme without the decryption failure problem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the definition and scheme of RS-IBE proposed by Wei et al. In Section 3, we point out that there is a correctness problem in Wei et al.'s RS-IBE scheme. In Section 4, we propose a method to solve this problem by. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Review of the RS-IBE Scheme
In this section, we review the definition of RS-IBE including the correctness property and describe the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al.
Revocable-Storage Identity-Based Encryption
Definition 2.1 (Revocable-Storage Identity-Based Encryption). A revocable-storage identity-based encryption (RS-IBE) scheme consists of eight algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveDK, Encrypt, UpdateCT, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1 λ , N max , T max ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1 λ , the maximum number of users N max , and the total number of time periods T max . It outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
GenKey(ID, MK, PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input an identity ID, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a private key SK ID .
UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP).
The key update algorithm takes as input update time T , a revocation list RL, the master key MK, a state ST , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a key update KU T .
DeriveDK(SK ID , KU T , PP). The decryption key derivation algorithm takes as input a private key SK ID , a key update KU T , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a decryption key DK ID,T .
Encrypt(ID, T, M, PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input an identity ID, time T , a message M, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CT ID,T .
UpdateCT(CT ID,T , T ′ , PP). The ciphertext update algorithm takes as a ciphertext CT ID,T , update time T ′ , and the public parameters PP. It outputs an updated ciphertext CT ID,T ′ .
Decrypt(CT ID,T ′ , DK ID,T , PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT ID,T ′ , a decryption key DK ID,T , and the public parameters PP. It outputs an encrypted message M or ⊥.
Revoke(ID, T, RL, ST, PP). The revocation algorithm takes as input an identity ID, revoked time T , a revocation list RL, and a state ST . It outputs an updated revocation list RL.
The correctness property of RS-IBE is defined as follows: For all MK, PP generated by Setup, any SK ID generated by GenKey(ID, MK, PP) for any ID, any KU T generated by UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP) for any T, RL, CT ID,T ′ generated by Encrypt(ID, T ′ , M, PP) for any ID, T ′ , M, if ID is not revoked at time T in RL, then it is required that DK ID,T can be derived by DeriveKey(SK ID , KU T , PP) and
•
Additionally, it is required that the ciphertext distribution of UpdateCT(CT ID,T , T ′ , PP) is statistically equal to that of Encrypt(ID, T ′ , M, PP).
Wei et al.'s RS-IBE Construction
To provide key revocation functionality, the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. [7] follows the binary tree-based broadcast encryption method proposed by Boldyreva et al. [1] . Let BT be a binary tree for handling key revocation. A user is randomly assigned to a leaf node in this BT . At this time, the private key SK ID of a user with an identity ID is associated with the set of nodes defined by Path(x ID ) which is the set of path nodes from the root node to the leaf node x ID , and a key update KU T at time T is associated with the set of covering nodes defined by KUNodes(BT , RL, T ) which is the set of nodes that covers all non-revoked leaf nodes at time T . If the leaf node (or the private key) of a user ID is not revoked at time T , then there is a common node x satisfyingx = Path(x ID ) ∩ KUNodes(BT , RL, T ). The decryption of a ciphertext at time T can be possible by using the private key element and key update element corresponding to the nodex. For the detailed description of KUNodes(BT , RL, T ), please refer the work of Boldyreva et al. [1] . To provide ciphertext update functionality, this RS-IBE scheme uses the binary tree idea of Canetti et al. [2] used to build forward-secure encryption schemes. Note that the binary tree idea for time management was widely used in other RS-ABE schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] . Let ET be a binary tree to handle time in a ciphertext. In this case, each time is sequentially allocated to a leaf node in ET from left to right. In this case, CTNodes(ET , T ) is defined as RightSibling(Path(v T )) \ Path(Parent(v T )) ∪ {v T } where RightSibling(S) is a set of RightChild(Parent(v)) of any node v ∈ S [4, 6] . Note that Wei et al. wrongly defined CTNodes(ET , T ) = {v|Parent(v) ∈ Path(v T ) and v / ∈ Path(v T )} ∪ {v T } because this (wrongly defined) set can include the left child node of Path(v T ), which will allow access to the past time node. To support ciphertext update, a ciphertext is constructed to have ciphertext elements associated with CTNodes(ET , T ). The main property of CTNodes is that if T < T ′ , a ciphertext with CTNodes(ET , T ) can be updated to a ciphertext with CTNodes(ET , T ′ ) because for any node v ′ ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ′ ) there is a node v ′′ that matches to CTNodes(ET , T ) ∩ Path(v ′ ) and the ciphertext component for v ′′ can be delegated to be a ciphertext for v ′ . For other properties of CTNodes, please refer the work of Sahai et al. [6] .
The RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. is described as follows:
Setup(1 λ , N max , T max ): Let λ be the security parameter, N max = 2 n be the maximum number of users, and T max = 2 ℓ be the total number of time periods. It chooses a bilinear group (p, G, G T , e) with a prime order p. It selects random g, g 2 ∈ G and α ∈ Z * p , and sets g 1 = g α . It also chooses random
where ID [i] and T [i] are the ith bit of ID and T respectively. It sets a binary tree BT with N max number of leaf nodes and sets a revocation list RL = / 0, a state ST = BT . It outputs a master key MK = g α 2 , and public
. GenKey(ID, MK, ST, PP): It assigns ID to a leaf node x ID ∈ BT . For each node x ∈ Path(x ID ), it performs:
1) It fetches g x,0 from the node x. If g x,0 is not defined before, then it chooses random g x,0 ∈ G and stores the pair (g x,0 , g x,1 = g 2 · g −1
x,0 ) in the node x.
2) It chooses random r x,0 ∈ Z * p and obtains SK ID,x = K x,0 = g α x,0 F u (ID) r x,0 , K x,1 = g r x,0 . Finally, it outputs a private key SK ID = {(x, SK ID,x )} x∈Path(x ID ) and an updated ST = BT .
UpdateKey(T, RL, MK, ST, PP): For each node x ∈ KUNodes(BT , RL, T ), it performs: 1) It fetches g x, 1 from the node x. If g x,1 is not defined, then it sets the value similar to the key generation algorithm.
2) It chooses random r x,1 ∈ Z * p and obtains KU T,x = U 0 = g α x,1 F h (T ) r x,1 ,U 1 = g r x,1 . Finally, it outputs a key update KU T = {(x, KU T,x )} x∈KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ) .
DeriveDK(SK ID , KU T , PP): It finds a common node x in both SK ID and KU T . If it fails to find, then it returns ⊥. Note that If ID was not revoked during the time period T , then there exist a node x ∈ Path(BT , x ID ) ∩ KUNodes(BT , RL, T ). For this node x, it retrieves SK ID,x = (K x,0 , K x,1 ) and KU T,x = (U x,0 ,U x,1 ) from SK ID and KU T respectively. It chooses random r 0 , r 1 ∈ Z * p and outputs a decryption key
Encrypt(ID, T, M, PP): Let ET be a binary tree for time periods and v T be a leaf node associated with T in ET . It chooses random s ∈ Z * p and computes
For each node v ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ), it performs: 1) It chooses random s v ∈ Z * p and sets
UpdateCT(CT ID,T , T ′ , PP): Let v T , v T ′ be leaf nodes in ET assigned to T, T ′ , respectively. If T ′ < T , then it returns ⊥ to indicate that T ′ is invalid. It chooses random s ′ ∈ Z * p and computes
For each node v ′ ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ′ ), it performs: 1) It find a node v ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ) such that b v is a prefix of b v ′ . 2) It chooses random s v ′ ∈ Z * p and sets
where v T ′ is a leaf node associated with T ′ .
Revoke(ID, T, RL, ST ):
It adds (ID, T ) to RL and returns the updated RL.
Wei et al. claimed that above RS-IBE scheme is correct and secure if the ℓ-BDHE assumption holds.
Analysis of the RS-IBE Scheme
In this section, we show that the above RS-IBE scheme is not correct since the decryption fails if the ciphertext time T is less than the decryption key time T ′ . Lemma 3.1. Let ET be a binary tree for time periods and v T , v T ′ be leaf nodes associated with time T, T ′ , respectively. If T + 1 ≤ T ′ , then there exists a nodeṽ = CTNodes(ET , T ) ∩ Path(v T ′ ) but v T =ṽ. That is, v T ,ṽ ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ), v is an ancestor node of v T ′ , and v T =ṽ.
Proof. By the main property of CTNodes, we have that for any node v ′ ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ′ ) there is a common node v ′′ such that v ′′ = CTNodes(ET , T ) ∩ Path(ET , v ′ ) if T + 1 ≤ T ′ . Therefore, for both nodes v T and v T ′ associated with time T and T ′ , there exists a nodeṽ = CTNodes(ET , T ) ∩ Path(ET , v T ′ . Now, Let's show that the node v T and the nodeṽ are different. In the given condition, T + 1 ≤ T ′ is established, and each time is sequentially assigned to a leaf node in ET . Therefore, two nodes v T , v T ′ are different nodes since T = T ′ and they are assigned to leaf nodes. Since the nodeṽ belongs to the path nodes Path(ET , v T ′ ), the nodeṽ can never be a leaf node ifṽ = v T ′ . Therefore,ṽ = v T is established, since v T = v T ′ and v T is a leaf node. Proof. To prove this theorem, we first analyze nodes in the binary tree ET which are associated with the ciphertext elements used in the decryption algorithm and then analyze how the random exponents of these ciphertext elements are constructed. After that, we argue that the decryption algorithm will fail due to the random exponents of the ciphertext elements which are used for decryption.
The decryption algorithm takes an original ciphertext CT ID,T and a decryption key DK ID,T ′ as input. Then, it performs the UpdateCT algorithm to derive an updated ciphertext CT ID,T ′ since T < T ′ . Next, it uses the updated ciphertext element C v T ′ ,0 , which is related to a leaf node v T ′ associated with the time T ′ , for the decryption. Here, the UpdateCT algorithm finds the nodeṽ which is an ancestor node of v T ′ and belongs to the set CTNodes(ET , T ), and delegates the ciphertext element Cṽ ,0 to obtain the ciphertext element C v T ′ ,0 . From the Lemma 3.1, we have that the nodeṽ which belongs to CTNodes(ET , T ) is not equal to the node
Now, we analyze random exponents in the original ciphertext CT ID,T which are associated with the nodes in CTNodes(ET , T ). The encryption algorithm generates ciphertext elements for nodes in CTNodes(ET , T ). According to the encryption algorithm, for each node v ∈ CTNodes(ET , T ), if v = v T , then the same random exponent s which is used for message encryption is used to generate C v,0 . If v = v T , then a new random exponent s v is selected to generate C v,0 . However, sinceṽ = v T from the previous Lemma 3.1, the random exponent sṽ is not equal to s with high probability where sṽ is used for the nodeṽ.
The decryption algorithm finally calculates the following equation by using the ciphertext elements and decryption elements.
Note that we ignored the re-randomization process since it does not affect our analysis. In order to correctly obtain the message contained in the ciphertext, it is required that (sṽ − s) ≡ 0 mod p should be satisfied. However, in the previous analysis, this relation cannot be satisfied because the ciphertext element associated with the nodeṽ of the original ciphertext uses a new random exponent sṽ. Thus, the decryption can be successful if T = T ′ , but the decryption always fails except with negligible probability if T + 1 ≤ T ′ .
Modification to the RS-IBE Scheme
In the previous section, we have shown that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not satisfy the correctness, which is the minimum requirement that the cryptographic scheme must satisfy, due to the problem of random exponents in the encryption algorithm. In this section, we propose a modification to the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. to guarantee the correctness and the security. A simple way to modify the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. [7] is to force the ciphertext elements associated with CTNodes(ET , T ) to use the same random exponent s which is used to encrypt a message in the ciphertext component C 0 . In this case, there is no problem such that the decryption algorithm fails when the ciphertext is updated since s v = s for all nodes v. However, this simple modification does not lead to a secure RS-IBE scheme. The reason is that if multiple nodes are provided with ciphertext elements {h s j } associated with the same random s, it is possible for anyone to use these elements to modify the original ciphertext element with current time to derive another ciphertext element with past time. This makes it possible for a revoked user to modify the ciphertext with current time to obtain a ciphertext with past time to decrypt the original ciphertext. Therefore, this simple method does not work.
A secure and efficient method to modify the RS-IBE scheme is to use a cryptographic scheme that supports ciphertext update functionality. Lee et al. [3] [4] [5] introduced the concept of self-updatable encryption and proposed secure SUE schemes that efficiently handle ciphertext updates. Thus, we can modify the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. to use the SUE scheme for the ciphertext update components and key update components. The secure SUE scheme proposed by Lee et al. supports correct decryption although it uses different random exponents in ciphertext elements associated with CTNodes(ET , T ). Additionally, this modified RS-IBE scheme can reduce the number of ciphertext elements from O(log 2 T max ) to O(log T max ) because of the efficiency of the SUE scheme. We also note that the existing RS-ABE scheme can be easily converted to an RS-IBE scheme by changing the attribute set of ABE to the identity of IBE.
Conclusion
In this paper, we pointed out that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not provide the correctness property. The problem of the RS-IBE scheme was that when a ciphertext with time T is updated to a ciphertext with time T + 1, this updated ciphertext cannot be decrypted by using a decryption key with time T + 1. The main reason of this problem was that the random exponent of the ciphertext element associated with a tree node corresponding to time T + 1 was not the same as the random exponent used to encrypt a message in the ciphertext. This decryption problem cannot be solved in a simple way, so we proposed a method to modify the previous RS-IBE scheme to be a secure and efficient RS-IBE scheme using a self-updatable encryption scheme.
